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COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE
RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
Charles H. Koch, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity deregulation has been managed by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), but FERC allowed the
industry to evolve the organizations for accomplishing it. 1
Deregulation of electricity required the vertical unbundling of the
integrated utilities which had unified all the industry segments
from generation to distribution. Thus, the major firms that held the
industry together are disappearing, and the system is seeking a
structure to fill the governance void those firms leave behind. After
considerable experimentation, the emerging model is the Regional
Transmission Organization ("RTO"), a not-for-profit authority that
acquires electricity and transmits it for distribution. Because they
sit astride the whole system, the RTOs' governance determines both
the capabilities of the system and the fair treatment of all those it
affects (which, given the nature of electricity in modern society,
ultimately means everyone). 2

Collaborative Governance
Obviously, the emerging electricity industry is inherently a
collaborative enterprise. Therefore, the principles of "collaborative

A.

* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of
Law. B.A., University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University,
1969; LL.M., University of Chicago, 1975.
1. FERC took the wise course of evolving frameworks for the development
of a restructured industry rather than dictating specific forms. The framework
for restructuring was established by Order 888, Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Order 888]. The main framework for the
development of transmission organizations, which is particularly relevant to
this Article, was provided by Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order
2000].
2. A history of electricity restructuring can be found in RICHARD F. HIRsH,
POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999).
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governance," developed largely by Jody Freeman, offer guidance for
these new public/private institutions. 3 Collaborative governance
seeks to reorient the conceptualization of administrative process
around techniques of joint problem solving and controlled
discretion. 4 It seeks an alternative to adversarial government and
explores concepts and processes which might replace interest group
5
contests with cooperation and dialogue.
The principles of
collaborative governance seem to speak directly to the evolving
electricity industry. For one thing, as Professor Freeman observed,
"[a] collaborative perspective requires that we reconceive the
relationships and responsibilities among public and private actors in
the regulatory process."6 Collaborative governance offers more in
that it fosters the development of a coherent theoretic framework for
those experimenting with alternatives to contest and coercive action.
Collaborative governance is characterized by five features:
1. A positive problem-solving orientation;
2. Broad participation by interested and affected persons at
all stages of the decision-making process;
3. Solutions that are provisional and subject to revision
(plasticity);
4. Accountability; and
5. Synergistic,
flexible,
and
engaged government
7
institutions.

The first feature exults positive problem solving rather than
contestability, compelled information sharing, and deliberation. The
second feature, broad participation, has the normative goal of
independent, democratic policymaking and the instrumental goal of
effective problem solving. The third feature, plasticity, seeks

3. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance];
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv.
L. REv. 1285 (2003); see also Sallyanne Payton, Professionalism as Third-Party
Governance: The Function and Dysfunction of Medicare, in MAKING
GoVERNMENT MANAGEABLE: EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE

TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 112 (Thomas H. Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg eds.,
2004). Professor Payton has, for years, explored this concept in her course "Law
of Cooperative Federalism" at the University of Michigan Law School.
4. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 3, at 22.
5. Americans, not just their lawyers, have a great deal of difficulty with
such behavioral norms. Much of the rest of the world finds it easier to engage
in community-regarding dispute resolution. Our instinctive competitiveness is
our strength and our weakness. Here, as perhaps elsewhere, this instinct can
inhibit the attainment of the ultimate goal. Our inability to engage in
cooperative decision making may accrue to our comparative disadvantage in the
increasingly interconnected world.
6. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 3, at 95.
7. Id. at 22.
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evolutionary decision making in which solutions to immediate
problems do not foreclose rethinking of both solutions and goals.
The fourth feature, accountability, undertakes new arrangements in
which parties are interdependent and accountable to each other.
The last feature, synergistic government, envisions coordinated
roles for public agencies, such as serving as facilitators and
information clearinghouses. While government may guide and
monitor performance, it does not dictate operations.
The whole package adds up to a strategy of cooperative decision
making.
Understanding cooperative decision making among
numerous diverse interests is advanced by Jim Rossi's insight that,
even though classic governance strategies exult participation over
all other values, the central consideration must be optimizing
deliberation. 8
Cooperative decision making, while valuing
participation,
must ultimately
serve
deliberative
goals.
Participation can establish an appearance of fairness but, in terms
of effective decision making, has a diminishing marginal utility to
the point of disutility. Focusing on effective and fair deliberation,
rather than the contributory value of participation, effectuates
cooperative decision making.
The collaborative governance package, applied to effective and
fair deliberation, and ultimately decision making, will enhance
governance in the electricity industry. The electricity industry
requires more sophisticated thinking about these principles. A more
collaborative, problem-solving goal for electricity governance will
change the conceptualization of the interaction among the interests.
Careful attention to the instrumental value of participation, as well
as its normative value, is nowhere more important than in
electricity governance. Applying this thinking, this Article seeks a
governance model that will better serve problem solving and satisfy
all the various interests that are involved in the substance as well
as the form of governance.
Collaborative governance contemplates a system of optimum
deliberation in the context of shared fundamental goals. The
breakdown of the electricity market in California is example enough
of the calamity of unrestrained self-interest in the interrelated
electricity environment and the damage it can do even to those
attempting to advance self-aggrandizing interests. In the short run,
and certainly in the long run, all are served by assuring the best
possible electricity system. Electricity governance is a complex
prisoners' dilemma in which individual self-interest may in fact
diminish the payoff for everyone, unlike most business relationships
in which competition has social value. Mutual trust is obviously not
enough; hence, positive governance is necessary. The governance
8. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) [hereinafter
Rossi, Participation Run Amok].
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structure must be effective and fair and also appear to be effective
and fair. This Article makes a few suggestions as to how to achieve
this governance goal.

B.

The Emerging Governance Model
Fortunately, FERC has allowed restructuring to evolve rather
than attempting to command any particular model. This process
has provided experimentation and variety, but a general model is
The emerging RTO governance model seems
emerging.
fundamentally sound, and improvements can build on this base.
These improvements should enhance access and involvement for all
interests. The model has attempted to assure participation by the
various interests, but it may not afford equal and actual influence
for all interests. The major obstacles are unequal expertise among
the interest groups and the cultural norms established during the
era of integrated utilities. Recommended are RTO-constituted and
-supported "representative" committees, representing certain
interests likely to be disadvantaged in presenting their views to the
governing body.
Also recommended is a reconstitution of state and local energy
authorities from second-tier and increasingly irrelevant regulatory
entities to independent and well-armed protectors of these
disadvantaged interests (in particular). At present, state and local
energy authorities are slowly, and probably unintentionally, being
co-opted by the RTOs. That is, while bringing state and local energy
authorities into governance, the RTOs are actually turning them
into nonentities. The public authorities should resist this pull and
stay independent of the RTOs. So constituted, local authorities can
find ways to help represent the public. They have the expertise and
the established stature, and hopefully they will retain the resources
to compensate for the advantages industry insiders have over other
affected interests.
II.

EMERGING GoVERNANCE MODELS IN ELECTRICITY
RESTRUCTURING

Industry Context
Even for the readers of an electricity symposium, a description
of the recent evolution of the electricity industry is necessary to
focus on the governance questions. 9 In the former regime, electricity
was delivered largely by integrated firms that supplied generation,
transmission, distribution, and various ancillary services. 10 The

A.

9. A good basic overview of the industry and the challenges facing it is
PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A
COMPETITIVE ERA (1997).

GUIDE TO THE

10. See JefferyS. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and
the Dormant Commerce Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State

2005]

COLLABORATNE GOVERNANCE

593

integrated firm was a highly efficient organization that delivered
reliable power at an acceptable price. Of course, integrated firms
were built around geographic monopolies, with the defects that
monopolies conjure up. Perceived failures of the regulation of these
monopolies, rather than breakdowns in performance, led to
deregulation. Restructuring started with the "unbundling'' of three
obviously related, but separate, segments of electricity production
and delivery: generation, transmission, and distribution. Markets
developed, with varying degrees of success, in generation and
distribution, but a market structure for transmission has not been
successfully implemented. Because transmission has defied pure
market solutions, organizing the new industry has proven extremely
difficult, belying simplistic pure market solutions.
Yet,
transmission sits astride the industry, connecting generation with
distribution and other marketing processes, and market failures in
transmission replicate the market failures of the old system that
resulted in regulatory solutions.
The current model emerged from the existing transmission
operation. Each integrated system had a central authority that
directed the flow of electricity. The generation, transmission, and
distribution segments in those systems were necessarily controlled
by such central offices. Therefore, the technical operation of the
electricity grid necessarily created a core operating authority. The
office performing these technical transmission operations, the
"system operator," naturally transformed into the managing entity
of each electricity system. Before restructuring, the system operator
ran the system through command. Thus, the system operator could
command the operation of the generators in the integrated system
based on the demand or expected demand communicated by the
distribution segment. With restructuring, the operation has moved
from intrafirm management to interfirm leadership of some
variation on a market. 11

B.

Examples of RTO Governance Processes
Various organizations were proposed and experimented with,
but in the end one archetypical organization emerged: the
Independent System Operator ("ISO"). The ISO emerged from the
technical manager of the former vertically integrated electric power
system. Because it had to retain many of the monopolist aspects of

Restrictions on the Development of Merchant Power Plants, 43 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 615, 622-23 (2003).
11. A recent study ofthe electricity industry found that both integrated and
nonintegrated models had governance advantages and disadvantages. Magali
Delmas & Yesim Tokat, Deregulation Process, Governance Structures and
Efficiency: The U.S. Electric Utility Sector, at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/
PDF/EPE_004.pdf(Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst. Working Paper Series, Mar. 2003)
(finding that integrated firms offered stability through insulation and
nonintegrated firms adapted better to new environments).
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the old regime, the system operator needed to be independent in
order to avoid monopolistic behavior. 12 The governance required
special attention to structuring the central (ostensible) transmission
authority to assure independence. Hence, governance strategies
were and are the root of independence in the independent system
operator.
Assuring this independence required effective
involvement of all interests from industry members to customers.
Because ISOs linked all the factors of electricity production and
distribution, their governance emerged as the key to an effective and
nondiscriminatory electricity system. Generally, it has also led to
13
ISOs being operated as not-for-profit entities.
The industry's geography changed as well. The markets of the
integrated utilities were "assigned" along state boundaries. For
largely regulatory reasons, each state was an isolated electricity
system. While this was never totally true because the systems had
limited interconnection for emergencies and ownership was not
limited by states, restructuring brought extensive, rather than just
incidental, interstate interconnection. The transmission systems,
and thereby whole integrated systems, became interstate.
Therefore, the model that emerged was the RTO, the number and
range of which have continued to evolve. The shift from statedefined entities to regional entities has governance implications,
both in structuring the core entity and in transforming the role of
state and local energy authorities.
In addition, RTOs have
increasingly taken on some international aspects.
(Already,
cooperation among U.S., Canadian, and Mexican systems has
become a feature of the North American electricity industry, and
closer organizational connections will certainly increase the
complexity of governance.) All this has shown that the governing
body must reflect not only the various interests, but an ever wider
geographic range with more public and private institutions involved.
Predictions are that the country will ultimately end up with
three RTOs (east of the Rockies, west of the Rockies, and Texas).
Indeed, it seems likely that the whole North American continent,
already somewhat interconnected, will eventually become
structurally united under one entity. (If this fails to happen, it will
12. RTOs seem to be moving in the direction of not-for-profit, and such
firms behave differently from for-profit firms. See Anup Malani et al., Theories
of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector: A Synthesis and Empirical
Evaluation, in THE GoVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 181
(Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003) ("[A)large body of theoretical and empirical work
has emerged to describe and document how NFP firms behave, focusing in
particular on how they behave differently than for-profit (FP) firms."). Given
the differences, specific research into the behavior of ISOs/RTOs would be
useful.
13. Experiments with for-profit entities, often called "transco," have failed,
usually because they have not been able to demonstrate the requisite
independence.
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be engineering constraints that prevent it.) At present, however,
there are significantly more than three RTOs. Six ISOs have
14
attained RTO status. Since a variety of RTOs are vying for place,
there are various governance models. While similar multifaceted
and multilevel governance structures are essentially replicated
throughout the existing RTOs, there are significant differences. 15
PJM Interconnection, covering the northeastern United States
("PJM"), and California Independent System Operator ("CAISO")
are two informative examples.

PJM: Governance Using a Corporate Model
PJM is the oldest RTO. It began before restructuring with the
combination of utilities in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland
(hence the acronym). Today, it seems positioned to manage the
entire East Coast grid. PJM is well established, with enough
success and longevity to give it some stature among RTO
organizations. PJM is steadily increasing its operating area and at
present coordinates the movements of electricity through all or part
of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Washington, D.C. PJM has resolved key issues of independence,
governance, and multi-state operation, and, therefore, serves as a
useful RTO governance model.
In the PJM governance system, the central authority is the
Board of Managers ("Board"). 16 The Board is charged with operating
a fair energy market. No person who has a personal affiliation,
ongoing professional relationship, or financial stake in any PJM
market participant may serve on the Board. 17
A Members
Committee provides advice to the Board and has representatives
from the key interests: generators, transmission owners,
distributors, other suppliers, and consumers. 18 A Nominating
Committee made up of stakeholders and Board members fills
1.

14. The current lineup is ISO New England, the New York ISO, the PJM
Interconnection, the Midwest ISO, and the California ISO. Added to these is
ERCOT ISO in Texas, which is not within FERC's jurisdiction.
15. F.E.R.C., RTO-ISO HANDBOOK 2-16 (2004).
16. PJM Interconnection, Independence, at http://www.pjm.com/about/
independence.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
17. PJM
INTERCONNECTION,
OPERATING
AGREEMENT
OF
PJM
INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C. § 7.2, at 30 (2003) [hereinafter PJM OA]. The
agreement was approved by FERC through 2004. PJM also serves as a good
example because its documents are so readily available, suggesting that
transparency may actually be good business given PJM's success.
18. Id. § 8.1.1, at 34. The Meml:>ers Committee includes all members of
PJM (approximately 330) and is too large to act as an effective governing body.
PJM
Interconnection,
PJM I MAAC
Members
Committee,
at
http://www. pjm.com/committees/membersldownloads/mc. pdf (last modified Mar.
23, 2005).
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vacancies on the Board. 19 The Market Monitoring Unit ("Unit")
guards against the exercise of market power by any market
participant. 20 The Unit analyzes market data and takes action to
make structural or rule changes to ensure the integrity of the
21
market.
Various specialized committees, such as the Reliability
Committee or the Finance Committee (collectively, the "Subject
Matter Committees"), work to refine and improve rules, policies, and
processes. 22 Input also comes from User Groups, such as nuclear
owners groups or environmental groups, and working groups (for
example, the Black Start Service Working Group and the Retail
Access Working Group). 23 PJM also pledges to "work closely with
state regulatory commissions to identify and respond to local
matters. "24 These state and local energy authorities are given
liaison or ex officio status on the Subject Matter Committees. 25

2.
CAISO: Governance Using a Government Model
Charles G. Stalon, a former FERC commissioner, contrasts the
"relatively strong'' PJM, as well as other northeastern RTOs, with
CAIS0. 26 The California governance structure has some of the same
19. PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 102 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,188 (2003) (order
accepting tariff sheets) (stating that PJM proposes to approve election to the
Board by a simple majority). The Nominating Committee consists of seven
voting members: one from each of the five sectors of the Members Committee
(generation, transmission, distribution, other suppliers, and end users) and two
members of the Board of Managers. PJM OA, supra note 17, § 7.1, at 29.
20. PJM Interconnection, Market Monitoring, at http://www.pjm.com/
markets/market-monitor/market-monitor.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
21. Id.
22. PJM Interconnection, PJM Committees, at http://www.pjm.com/
committees/pjm.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
23. PJM
Interconnection,
Working
Groups I User
Groups,
at
http://www.pjm.com/committees/work-group.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
24. PJM Interconnection, Independence, at http://www.pjm.com/about/
independence.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
25. PJM OA, supra note 17, § 8.2.2, at 35.
26. Charles G. Stalon, What Went Wrong in California, at
http://www.icc.state.il.us/ec/docs/010214calstalon.pdf ((Feb. 8, 2001)). Stalon
writes:
[The Northeastern ISOs] have much more information at their
disposal than does the California ISO and PX [POOLCO].
In California both the ISO and PX had large "stakeholder" boards.
In contrast [to California], the three Northeastern SOS have relative
small "independent" boards. This has permitted the FERC to place
important responsibilities on the Northeastern ISOs and for those
ISOs to respond and make relatively quick reforms to make their
system work better.
These boards are preserving the credibility of the markets in their
territories despite the fact that the legislatures in the Northeast
states have made some of the same compromises that were made in
California, especially ones that created inelastic demand curves.
Id. at 5.
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27

general components as the PJM. Whereas the PJM structure
evolved from the corporate model, however, CAISO reflects a
governmental model. In 1997, CAISO started with a twenty-sevenmember board, representing various interests in the electricity
industry, from industry members to consumers. CAISO proved to be
a triumph of participation over operational effectiveness. While
CAISO had the political benefit of seating all the interests at the
table, it proved incapable of governing itself. 28
In 2001, the California legislature passed legislation disbanding
the CAISO board and creating the current five-member board
appointed by the governor. 29 FERC rejected this design. 30 Although
it applauded the improvement over the prior board, FERC decided
that a governor-appointed board was insufficiently independent.
Since California was a market participant, it was a significant
stakeholder. 31 FERC insisted on an independent, non-stakeholder
board. The D.C. Circuit, however, vacated FERC's order "[b]ecause
FERC has no authority to replace the selection method or
membership of the governing board of an ISO, let alone to compel a
corporation created by state law to employ a governing board chose
in violation of that law ... .',a2
Issues of authority aside, FERC's stakeholder objection seems
myopic. Of more concern must be the Board's political nature. The
CAISO board raises many of the same problems identified with
other, often five-member, state regulatory agencies. In fact, the
CAISO board is more problematic, because, unlike the regulatory
authorities, the CAISO board has direct management
responsibilities. Again, the successful system must incorporate
principles of collaborative governance, where government and
private authorities work together as problem solvers.
As
government institutes become more dominant, decision making
27. CAL. INDEPENDENT SYS. OPERATOR CORP., AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS
OF CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORP., at http://www.caiso.com/
docs/2000/06/01/2000060110361815044.pdf (Apr. 2001).
28. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 93 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,121, (2000) (stating that
the Board was having "such difficulty reaching decisions on the complex and
divisive issues confronting it that it has become ineffective" and it was coming
under "undue pressure from various sources."); see also Stalon, supra note 26
("In California both the ISO and the PX had large 'stakeholder' boards.").
29. A.B. 5, 2001 Leg., 1st Exec. Sess. (Ca. 2001); see also CAL. AsSEMBLY
COMM. ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, REPORT ON ELECTRICAL
RESTRUCTURING
(200 1),
available
at
http://www .leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
0102/bill/asm/ab_00010050/abxl_5_cfa_20010111_171856_asm_comm.html;
CAL. AsSEMBLY SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMM., BILL
ANALYSIS
(2001),
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
01-02/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/abx_5_cfa_20010117_114651_sen_comm.html.
30. Mirant Delta, L.L.C., 100 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,059, at 61,227 (2002).
31. Id. at 61,222 ("[The Department of Water Resources) is now the largest
purchaser of energy in the California wholesale market.").
32. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
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becomes political rather than technical and economic. While a
stakeholder board raises the specter of discrimination against one or
more interest groups, a political board presents the danger of
exogenous motivations.
Members of a board chosen by an elected official are also more
likely to be selected for their political competence than for their
knowledge of the electricity industry. 33 Competent management of
the system is crucial. Chaos in California revealed the potential
damage from sophisticated gaming of the system and from
governance characteristics that make a system incapable of dealing
with such conduct. 34 In short, governance cannot rely on members to
deal honestly with their RTOs. The inability of CAISO to respond to
events, including obvious dishonesty, provides a lesson for RTO
design. The California crisis also demonstrates that collaborative
governance must be capable of dealing with the worst motives of any
market participant. 35 This experience emphasizes the danger of
putting broad participation, even if politically beneficial, ahead of
viable decision making. In other words, a governing organization
must not only be able to manage a complex electricity system, it
must also be able to make decisions in the face of highly
sophisticated efforts to manipulate any system.
In sum, positive government is necessary in the electricity
industry. Yet, the classic corporate governance form of the
integrated era must be replaced by more broadly accessible,
accountable,
and
transparent decision-making structures.
Breakdowns in some attempts to develop governance organizations
provide experiential information that will spur the evolution of
optimum RTO governance. Of more value is the governance process
used by the most successful RTO. This organization has modified
the corporate model in a way that is sensitive to these broader goals
and should form the foundation for a universal governance model.
Nonetheless,
examination of the
impediments
to full
accomplishment of the collaborative government principles suggests
some improvements on that model.

33. Mirant Delta, L.L.C., 100 F.E.R.C. 'II. 61,059, at 61,229 ("As the Audit
Report details, the current Board members, for the most part, 'have no prior
utility experience.'").
34. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted?
The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX
L.J. 1 (2004); see also Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learning from
the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002).
35. See generally CAL. ISO BD. OF GoVERNORS, REPORT BY THE CALIFORNIA
ISO BOARD OF GoVERNORS REGARDING MATTERS RAISED BY THE SENATE SELECT
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE PRICE MANIPULATION OF THE WHOLESALE ENERGY MKT., at
http://www .caiso.com/docs/2004/06/04/2004060408060514905. pdf (June 2004).
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Ill. IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING
Being "in the room," does not mean having influence in the
electricity industry. Electricity is a unique commodity in terms of
both engineering and economics. Affecting decision making requires
considerable sophistication in engineering, "the business," and a
specialty brand of law. In addition, the industry has been operating
for more than one hundred years and, over that time, interest
groupings have been established that will not soon be dissipated. In
short, cooperative decision making, as opposed to mere pro forma
broad participation, must adjust for unequal expertise and an
entrenched industry culture.

A

Importance of Expertise to Influence
Electricity is not like other products. For one thing, its "units"
are not just fungible but identical. While electricity is described in
units (for example, it is sold in kilowatt hours), one unit is
indistinguishable from another. Where one unit of electricity ends,
another begins without interruption. Indeed, electricity is a
continuous flow. One who buys a kilowatt hour does not know the
source of that particular kilowatt hour. One who produces a
kilowatt hour does not know who actually consumes that kilowatt
hour. In short, the industry cannot be envisioned in terms of the
normal operation of a market, with buyers purchasing a particular
unit through a negotiation with a particular seller. Simply for a
consumer to reach a contract with a generator to supply electricity is
impossible. Thus, after the elimination of the integrated system
(wherein consumers bought a bundled end product from an
integrated supplier), the "contract path" (through which the
generated electricity passed from the generator through the
transmission lines and distribution system to an end user) became a
fiction that allowed market participants to visualize an electricity
market in traditional terms. But this vision is not real in either
engineering or market terms.
Adding to potential misunderstanding by the uninitiated is the
engineering reality of "transporting'' electricity. Electricity cannot
be directed. A unit of electricity cannot be loaded on a truck and
shipped to a designated destination, nor can its transportation be
accurately visualized in those terms. Electricity cannot even be
directed by valves and pumps, as can water and gas; it must be
teased along through engineering that even those in the industry do
not fully grasp. In short, outsiders are at sea and easily deceived,
especially by language that tends to convey a sense of control that is
not reality.
Both engineering and market features create an inherent
advantage for those who understand the engineering and
commercial realities of the industry.
Conversely, the same
engineering and commercial complexities create impressive
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impediments and overwhelming disadvantages for outsiders. For
example, an outsider might think that building new facilities will
necessarily upgrade the system. However, insiders know that it is
possible that building a new generator or even transmission line
might result in a decrease in available electricity. Even if the new
facility succeeds in injecting additional electricity into the system,
more expensive new electricity might displace cheaper established
electricity.
The complexity of generating and transmitting
electricity makes broad participation, accountability, and
understandable transparency equally complex goals.
Issues relevant directly to generation and transmission are
further clouded by the variety of "ancillary" services associated with
getting the electricity to its markets. Control of ancillary services
can bias an electricity system. One not familiar with the actual
operating components of the electricity industry will not understand
the implications of decisions and policies relating to this
conglomeration of often very technical services. The ancillary
services themselves in the restructured industry create a whole body
of new and challenging scientific and economic questions. The
uninitiated, however, may see them as, well, ancillary and--even if
they
understand
their importance-will
have
difficulty
understanding the policy choices these services present.
In sum, the absence of not just expertise but real understanding
of the realities of generating, transmitting, and distributing
electricity makes participation by outsiders somewhat pro forma.
Even without conscious efforts to deceive, the values built into the
system by insiders might be questioned by representatives of less
knowledgeable interest groups, if such groups were as
knowledgeable as the insiders.
Unfortunately, knowledgeable
The inequality of engineering and
outsiders are a rarity.
commercial expertise between insiders and outsiders cannot be
compensated for by "book learning." Actual operating experience is
crucial, yet this experience is available only to those within the
industry. Overcoming the expertise deficit is a special challenge for
cooperative decision making in the electricity industry.

B.

Restructuring the Cultural Hierarchy
Culture is resilient, and significantly displacing established
cultures is a long and uncertain process. The segments of the
electricity industry were united in a vertically integrated culture as
well as corporate form. This culture and its concomitant hierarchies
will be the last remnants of the old regime to disappear in the
restructured electricity industry. This embedded stratification
continues to dictate the relationship among industry participants in
the new regime. In addition, this culture skews the participation by
players in the system, both public and private, who for generations
orbited these dominant bodies. These interests are struggling to

2005]

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

601

find places within the new restructured regime. The new culture,
perhaps more than the old, vertically integrated structure, remains
a major impediment to true cooperative decision making.

1. The Integrated Industry Culture
The central authority of the integrated utility derived from
control of the "big wires" (the cross-country, ''wholesale"
transmission assets). When integrated utilities were forced to
"unbundle," they tended to retain ownership (and thereby control) of
transmission and to divest generation and (where, possible)
distribution functions. As ISOs evolved into RTOs, they aimed to
separate control from ownership of transmission because control of
the big wires meant control of the system. Still, even with nominal
control of the lines by the ISO or RTO, transmission owners retained
their dominant position, much like the old aristocracies in
nineteenth-century democracies. The continued dominance of the
transmission owners persists, and they have substantial say, no
matter the form of participation, in the new system. The cultural
stratification of the industry has continued into the restructuring
era.
Two key segments that were once part of the integrated firm,
generation and distribution, retain adjunct status and thereby
maintain insider status, which results in coordinate relationships.
Restructuring has focused on the problem of "affiliates." Affiliate
firms are firms that are separate in corporate form but have
common owners; affiliates sometimes continue their old
relationships, to the detriment of the market. Despite efforts to
limit the flow of information among affiliates, many fmd that
inappropriate communication still exists and negatively affects the
performance of the industry. A level playing field would go a long
way in creating real separation and independence among the
segments of the former regime, but insiders have had difficulty
breaking free of the old power relationships.
True cooperative decision making requires real influence for
groups that were industry outsiders under the old vertically
integrated regime. Small firms and public power organizations are
chief among these. After Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 36
public power and cooperatives provided the only real competition,
indeed countervailing force, in the industry. Since restructuring,
public power and cooperatives retain their pariah status within the

36. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). This case is seminal because it recognized the
possibility of competition in the electricity industry and began the restructuring
movement. Significant even today is the example of abusive behavior by the
large, integrated utility. The utility attempted to drive out competition from
small municipal utilities which were able to sell electricity at prices well below
those of the dominant utility. Such conduct continues to be a potential danger.

602

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

electricity establishment. 37 On the other hand, they still provide the
best opportunity for retail competition in many markets. Bringing
such entities into the structure, and perhaps facilitating their
growth, should be a goal of the RTOs. Listening to the needs of
public power and cooperative organizations will enable them to
continue to serve as the best hope for mitigating market dominance
and indeed challenging the practices of the central governing entity.
RTO governance must promote such a role.

2. Customers and Industry Culture
Restructuring actually intensified the divide on the other side of
the market: the consumer side. For convenience, consumers may be
segregated into three groups: large business, small business, and
residential. 38 In the integrated culture, large businesses dealt on a
somewhat equal business footing with their soul mates, the large
integrated utilities. The contestability of their relationship was
somewhat "off-stage."
Even large consumers in a regulated
environment took what the system gave them. However, large
consumers could be players in the political environment of perhaps
equal stature to that of the utilities. Large consumers have enough
economic power to create alternatives, even when their local utility
has some degree of market power. Restructuring has opened a
contest in the marketplace as well as the political arena. Indeed, in
this new regime, the large business customers might obtain some
economic advantage since alternatives to the local utility have
evolved to compete for their business. Moreover, as the power of the
utilities is diminished by unbundling, the utilities tend to need
alliances with their large customers to dominate the political
· environment. New alliances in the political arena create a danger of
utilities and their large and politically powerful consumers
exercising unified power in RTO governance.
Neither small business nor residential consumers gain
bargaining power through restructuring, and both continue to be
price and service takers. In the former regime, they were protected
by regulation. Now small consumers depend on a real, functioning
market and are the most likely victims of market failures. While big
consumers have the power to assure against such failures, small
business and residential consumers must depend on the protection
afforded by collaborative action with the RT0. 39 Their stake in RTO
37. See Order 2000, supra note 1, § H.1, at 930-31.
38. One convenient divide, for example, defines large commercial and
industrial customers as those that use more than one hundred to two hundred
kilowatt hours. ABA SECTION OF PuBLIC UTILITY, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
TRANSPORTATION LAW, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 189 (2004).
39. See generally John E. Kwoka, Jr., Governance Alternatives and Pricing
in the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 18 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 278 (2002). This
study finds that public ownership and the commensurate public influence had
very different effects among consumer groups, with residential customers
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governance is highest. Yet, small consumers may find big business
and utility owners dominating RTO governance. Small businesses
and, even more, residential consumers are both individually
powerless. Residential consumers find it particularly difficult to
organize for their own protection. Fair RTO governance must
assure a voice for these small consumers that is not surreptitiously
dominated by the more powerful interests. It must assure that the
small consumers are not submerged within a universal "consumer"
interest as defined by large industrial and commercial consumers.
The tendency to measure success of restructuring in aggregates
and averages hides the real impact on small business and
residential consumers. AI; the industry opens to farther ranging
market opportunities, there will be losers. For example, Virginia
historically has had relatively low rates. It is now joining PJM and,
as a result, Virginia utilities will have access to the northeastern
markets, in which rates are high. Virginia's utilities lobbied hard
for this opportunity to sell in markets that offer higher profits
despite opposition from state regulators. 40 Victory for the utilities
means they can expect to move electricity into these new, more
lucrative markets. In aggregate, east coast rates might decrease,
but prices are equally likely to increase for Virginia's small business
and residential consumers, who are not able to bargain for long-term
RTO management will not intervene to equalize
contracts.
bargaining power among consumer groups. The disincentive for
RTO management to protect these small consumers increases the
vulnerability of these politically weak consumer groups. Adequate
opportunities to participate in governance decisions, as well as
transparency and accountability in RTO decisions, may lead to
choices that will mitigate this impact as the mechanics of true
cooperative decision making are developed.
The influence of residential consumers is further weakened by
the realities of the electricity market. For retail consumers,
restructuring is the triumph of theory over practice.
Retail
consumers are not likely to assume what economists call the "search
costs" to make a viable competitive residential market. Thus, if
residential consumers are to get a fair deal (let alone an advantage)
from restructuring, it will be through the vigilance of the RTO
governing entity and government energy authorities. Hence, these
consumers in particular need adequate representation in the RTO
governing entity.
benefiting most, commercial customers less, and industrial customers not at all.
Id. at 291-92. If similar behavior can be expected from RTOs which are made
truly responsive to the public, then that real representation can be expected to
have tangible benefits for residential consumers.
40. See generally VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, REVIEW OF
FERC's PROPOSED STANDARD MARKET DESIGN AND POTENTIAL RISK TO ELECTRIC
SERVICE IN VIRGINIA (Jan. 3, 2003), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/
caseinfo/reportsllttf_addendum_02.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2004).
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3. The Underrepresented
There is another group of consumers for which the danger is not
underrepresentation, but no representation.
These are the
consumers who were protected under the old regime by the
41
"universal service" principle.
In 2005, even the lowest economic
level of the community requires electricity. The old regulatory
regime could assure service by fiat, but guaranteed service is
inimical to a market approach. Restructuring means that protection
of service must be dealt with outside the electricity market
mechanisms. Rather than being imposed by regulatory authorities,
universal electricity service must be part of the social benefits
package. Nonetheless, choices will be made that affect those unable
to pay market prices, and those interests must be effectively
represented in RTO governance. Cooperative decision making in
this regard may mean surrogate representatives, either public or
private, for interests that have no ability to represent themselves.
4. Captive Researcher Usue
All of the above interests are visible, though some are not
adequately represented in electricity governance. The stealth
players in the old menage who may be perhaps even more dominant
in the new regime are the captured research organizations and
scholars.
Utility wealth allows it to finance research and
scholarship in policy advocacy as well as in technical innovation.
(Indeed, a motivation for restructuring was the assertion that the
old monopolies lacked incentives to advance technology and
conversely were unduly motivated to engage in policy advocacy.)
The alliances of these information generators were disclosed to me
when I suggested to several associations representing the various
electricity interests that an objective, impartial research
undertaking to provide objective, independent study and
information was needed. The lack of interest surprised me until one
association official told me they did not want such impartiality. An
expose of the Harvard group further supports skepticism as to the
relationship between key scholars and the industry. 42 Transparency
and a special type of accountability are essential to the effective and
fair policymaking future of the industry. Yet the foundational
information on which policy is based continues to be provided by
scholars and research organizations of questionable alliances and
motivations. Unless this group of captive researchers can be
41. Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1288-99 (1998); Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive
Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27,
38-47 (2000).
42. Harvard Watch, Trading Truth: A Report on Harvard's Enron
Entanglements, at http://www.harvardwatch.org (Jan. 31, 2002).
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counterbalanced, interest groups without such support will
participate at a great disadvantage. The RTOs should fill the gap.
To avoid similar capture, their study arms should operate under
conditions of extreme transparency and should define their "clients"
as the entire universe of market participants, related interests, and
information users.
Culture is, of course, the most persistent of human institutions.
Changing the structure of the electricity industry no more changes
its culture than it does in other human endeavors. Governance
design, therefore, must confront the remnants of the old integrated
culture and not assume that institutional change is unaffected by
that culture. But cultures do change and, over time, participation,
accountability, and transparency become vehicles for changing the
culture of the electricity industry. However, restructuring now
ignores the depth of these integrated company instincts at the
expense of its ultimate performance.
IV. CUSTOM DESIGN FOR COOPERATIVE RTO DECISION MAKING
As we know, electricity is not an industry in which deregulation
can be a simple matter of setting the industry free. Deregulation
required a sophisticated new industry design, "restructuring." As
the market devices must be special, so too must the industry's
decision-making mechanisms be specially designed with careful
attention to the nature of the industry and the organizational
culture. In addition, the RTOs must be public-regarding. While they
should not replicate the general political process, they cannot regard
themselves as merely private businesses. 43 Diversity of interests
requires cooperative decision making, and cooperative decision
making is impeded by inequalities in resources and position. At
present, these difficulties are glossed over by superficial
opportunities for broad participation. But, as we have seen, the
focus must be on thoughtful deliberation and sound and impartial
decision making. 44
The process goal must be to design a
collaborative problem-solving organization that allows a real public
dialogue in the face of unique impediments to that dialogue.

A.

A Proposal for the Next Step in Governance
Proposed here is a design in which an impartial board decides
and each interest group has its own independent representative to
the impartial board. Charles Stalon has observed that a small,
impartial core governing body works better than large, seemingly
inclusive bodies. 45 The optimal central board provides a mechanism
43. See Kwoka, supra note 39, at 280 ("[A] privately owned utility is
ultimately responsible to its shareholders and therefore should pursue profit
maximization rather than managerial benefit or consumer group preference.").
44. See Rossi, Participation Run Amok, supra note 8.
45. See Stalon, supra note 26.

606

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

for competitive policy development rather than inclusion.
A
dialectic within this governance structure assures real consideration
of all the diverse interests. Such a dialectic should result in the
movement of deliberation toward a consensus even in an
organization with clearly distinct interests among its members. In
an industry with as many competing interest groups as electricity,
the airing of all views and the competition between those views will
work so long as the deliberation works toward the common optimum
performance goal. (As opposed to, say, making profit for certain
industry segments or promoting environmental extremism.) The
common goal of a sound and acceptable electricity system in the end
should compel shared objectives.
The vision then is a core impartial deliberative body with
interests organized to represent themselves and with the
organizational structure designed to assure all these interests have
real influence. That is, instead of various interests submerged
within the deliberative body, each interest is organized, recognized,
and represented as a discrete force. To accomplish this, the RTOs
should constitute "Representative Committees," whose members
would come entirely from members of an interest.
These
committees would have staffs that provide them with information
and help them with the presentation of their interest.
Superficially, the RTO model seems to have adopted this
approach. That is, there is a strong movement towards an impartial
managing board with various committees promoting policies in their
specialized areas. Suggested here, however, is that this approach,
while close, fails to foster effective, equal, and transparent
participation by each of the basic interests. Both expertise and
cultural tendencies allow the old regime to continue to control RTO
governance within these committees and on the central governing
board.

B.

Building on PJM's Model
PJM, because of its longstanding success, serves as a good
46
The
example of a basic RTO governance organization.
47
foundational model, as described above, is a general corporate
approach, but with an effort to bring into governance the various
divergent interests.
Each interest has input into the ultimate authority. Additional
interest representation is provided by the hierarchy of Subject
Matter Committees that advise the board. 48 These committees
46. PJM OA, supra note 17, at 29-40. The agreement was approved by
FERC through 2004. PJM also serves as a good example because its documents
are so readily available, suggesting that transparency may actually be good
business given PJM's success.
4 7. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
48. PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM MEMBERS HANDBOOK 6 (2003), available at
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provide concentrated and expert recommendations on specialized
issues. The Members Committee and each of the Subject Matter
Committees include representatives of five sectors: generation
owners, other suppliers, transmission owners, electric distributors,
and end-use customers.
This sector representation allows
participation by divergent members within these committees. The
PJM governance materials state:
The committees and user groups provide a forum through
which stakeholders share their positions and resolve
difficult issues. Market committees are an essential
component of PJM's governance structure for
administering an open-access, transparent grid and
markets.
This collaborative approach-a hallmark of the way PJM
conducts business-enhances our ability to manage the
grid, maintain reliability and assure robust markets. 49
This system is inclusive as far as it goes, but cooperative
decision making requires more than just adjunct "forums."
In order to assure real voice, as opposed to mere form, I would
add to the existing committee structure "Representative
Committees." Representative Committees would differ from the
Subject Matter Committees currently incorporated in the general
RTO!ISO model. 50 The Subject Matter Committees, like the Board of
Managers, mask the relationship between the various interests and
prevent some interests from having their own influence. Each
member is represented on these committees, but this merely
replicates the same alliances and cultural positions that existed in
the integrated industry. 51 Thus, the committees can be dominated
http://www.pjm.com/committeeslhandbook.pdf [hereinafter PJM MEMBERS
HANDBOOK]. The handbook notes:
PJM's Committee structure includes three Senior Standing
Committees (Members, Electricity Markets and Reliability
Committees), three additional Standing Committees (Market
Implementation,
Operating
and
Planning
Committees),
subcommittees or working groups created by these six committees,
and user groups established in accordance with PJM's Operating
Agreement.
Reports and proposals will flow from the subcommittees and
working groups to their "parent" Standing Committee and from there
to the "parent" Senior Committee. User groups' report and proposal
procedures are defined in PJM's Operating Agreement.
I d.; see also id. at 7 (outlining a graphic diagram of PJM committee structure).
49. PJM Interconnection, Committees and Groups, at http://www.pjm.com/
committees/committees.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
50. An example is PJM. Its committees are described in PJM MEMBERS
HANDBOOK, supra note 48.
51. See
PJM
Interconnection,
Committees
and
Groups,
at
http://www.pjm.com/committees/committees.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005)
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by the same interests that dominate the core decision-making
authority. Representative Committees would give each sector a
distinct voice.
Moreover, Subject Matter Committee representation does not
necessarily give a voice to the diverse interests within a sector. Of
particular concern is the end-use consumer sector. Big business
interests will likely represent consumers on these Subject Matter
Committees, and their interests may differ significantly from those
of residential consumers. A Representative Committee would
encompass all consumer groups. Its positions would reflect an
aggregate. Indeed, their positions could reflect disagreement among
consumers. Regardless, the Representative Committee would allow
transparent airing of several consumer positions and would add
weight to a consumer position in both the Subject Matter
Committees and the central management board.
Members of a Representative Committee would all come from a
specific interest. In this way, the Representative Committee would
publicly espouse those interests. The key to success will be the open
expression of each interest's position on matters of particular
importance to it. This open contestability for RTO policymaking will
promote a real dialogue on issues. The disparity in resources and
expertise of the various interest groups, however, means that each
Representative Committee must be specially constituted to assure
that it can actually represent the interest. A residential consumer
committee, for example, would be useless unless its members had
analytical resources as well as time and commitment.
The
experience with Negotiated Rulemaking tells us that a public
interest representative cannot match industry in assuring that they
"have a voice."52 The lesson that Negotiated Rulemaking teaches us
is that participatory opportunities must be carefully tailored to the
interests less able to represent themselves. Because resource
inequality is a major impediment to giving voice to these interests,
the Representative Committees should be funded by the RTOs in
the same way as the Subject Matter Committees. Since some of
these interests necessarily lack expertise, the RTO should assure
that some, at least, of these Representative Committees have expert
advice available through either permanent staff or consultants.

C.

Implementation Concerns
Perhaps public advocacy will not be enough. More weight could
be added by giving the Representative Committees' views special
weight. This process would require that, for specified types of
decisions, Representative Committees of specially impacted
("Members can designate a representative for any committee using an online
form.").
52. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.36
(2d ed. 1997).
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interests would be consulted, and their views would have special
weight in the adoption of a measure. No interest, even nominally
"public interests," on the other hand, should have essentially a veto
over any matter, even those of special concern to the interest.
Giving Representative Committees weight without shifting the
balance so that they have undue influence would be the key. One
approach would be that changes suggested by that Representative
Committee may only be rejected by a supermajority of the board.
Under other previously identified conditions, Representative
Committee views would require special justification and support for
a measure.
Now I have created the platform for a multitude of committees.
The Subject Matter Committees are themselves numerous as well as
useful. Representative Committees, however, may not be similarly
numerous. Not all interests need a Representative Committee.
Large transmission owners and large industrial consumers can
safely be discriminated against in this regard. They are likely to
have sufficient influence absent participation in the Representative
Committees.
Moreover, there can be a distinction between a direct interest
that requires a RTO-supported Representative Committee and other
more indirect interests, such as general business, broad
environmental advocacy, or local governments.
Some
Representative Committees might be identified as advocacy-only
committees. The RTO should assure access to the Representative
Committee structure for other interests, which are left to choose
how they will organize themselves. As to these less-structured
interests, the RTO, while not sponsoring the interest, should
concern itself if these interests are not represented in some form.
For example, the RTO should assure the participation of social
welfare advocates concerned with universal service issues, even
though these problems in the market environment will generally be
dealt with elsewhere.
The emerging governance regime has potential in that the RTO
Subject Matter Committee approach assures the participation of
diverse interests, as in the case of the PJM. However, the danger is
that because of disparities in expertise and stature, mere
representation on each Subject Matter Committee will not assure
real participation and accountability. Representative Committees
provide a single voice for each crucial interest, and supplying the
Representative Committees with advice and expertise will allow
these otherwise underrepresented interests to have actual influence
in the governance process.

V.

RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY AUTHORITIES

As direct governance shifts to regional (multistate) authorities

and remaining regulation by necessity becomes national and is
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dominated by FERC, state and local energy authorities are slowly
being pushed off the stage. 53 These authorities have fought this
movement politically, but practically they seem increasingly
54
irrelevant. They cling to their status under the Federal Power Act,
but their loss of real power is inevitable. Yet this new regime
creates new opportunities if the state and local energy authorities
have the vision to seize them. These institutions could play vibrant
and perhaps crucial roles in the restructured industry.

A.

A Mere Change in Character
The current regime has been evolving a role for state and local
energy authorities. RTO entities are developing ways to bring these
authorities within their compass. 55 While this movement may be
attractive to the authorities as they contemplate the loss of real
regulatory authority, it may trap them in a superficial role. Rather
than gratefully letting FERC and the RTOs impose this inferior role,
they should redefine their own role in the new regime. This role
should clearly separate these governmental authorities from the
private business operations. The state regulators should avoid
becoming hollow relics of the regulatory age and transform
themselves into public representatives, investigative/disclosure
vehicles, ultimate monitors/whistleblowers, and the instruments for
resolving individual disputes between their citizens and the
electricity industry. 56
53. In a way, this may be an overstatement. While there is a strong
movement among electricity entities toward creating or joining regional
transmission organizations, many states are not actively restructuring. Status
of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of February 2003, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity (Feb. 2003). Even though the Supreme
Court accepted the notion that FERC could assert jurisdiction over regional
electricity organizations in New York u. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 23-24 (2002), the
ultimate function of state regulatory authorities in the emerging system has yet
to be decided. As always, that will be a political question.
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-93, 796-818, 820-23, 823a-25r (2000).
55. For example, governmental authorities may have ex officio status on
any Subject Matter Committee and/or be represented through a "Liaison
Committee." See PJM OA, supra note 17, § 8.2.2, at 35; see also PJM
Interconnection, PJM Committees, at http://www. pjm.com/committees/
pjm.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). ("The State Commission Liaison
Committee, consisting of all the PJM state utility commissioners, meets
annually with the PJM Board of Managers to discuss matters of mutual
interest.").
56. In a sense, state agencies may have come full circle. The Massachusetts
Board of Railroad Commissioners under Charles Francis Adams, the first
important regulatory-like authority, was committed to these types of roles:
[Adams' and his fellow railroad commissioners'] theme, in a word, was
voluntarism, promoted by publicity and disclosure, disciplined by the
unwavering support of the state legislature. When the question at
hand involved general policy, the commission initiated. When the
issue had to do with some particular controversy, the commission
reacted. In all cases, the agency advised rather than coerced. It
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State and local energy authorities could inject truly
independent elements into the restructured regime. The state
Public Utility Commission or Public Service Commission staffs,
along with many local energy authorities, offer a pool of expert and
independent workers who could be employed in many public interest
roles and perform functions that cannot be expected to be
accomplished otherwise. As discussed above, real participation
requires expertise. Many of the interests affected by RTO decisions,
even with access, cannot expect to have influence because they
cannot hope to marshal equal or even adequate understanding of the
complex engineering and commercial issues at stake. The state and
local energy authority staffs already employ the necessary experts.
In addition to expertise disparities, as discussed above, existing
industry culture often dictates the role of the players in the
restructured industry. The state and local energy authorities
traditionally play the roles of monitor, public representative, and
ombudsman in individual disputes. Both the industry and the
citizenry are accustomed to the state regulators playing those roles.
The established culture does not need to be changed in order for
them to continue to do so, and they can easily reconfigure
themselves into these roles. At the same time as they are losing
some direct control over a part of the industry, they could
seamlessly upgrade and concentrate on these roles. In the end, the
state regulators could fill a very special and pervasive role,
projecting them into every aspect of the industry, including those
from which they had been excluded under the old regime.

B.

Various Roles State Regulators Could Assume
The existing expertise and stature of the state and local energy
authorities is too valuable a resource to be squandered. In order to
make full use of this resource, state and local governments, as well
as the agencies themselves, must leave behind the past functions
associated with direct regulation over retail rates and performance.
Their new roles could include acting as public representatives,
information gatherers and disseminators, monitors of general
industry conduct, and protectors of their citizens in individual
disputes with industry players.

1. Public Representative
The best representative for the public and other especially
representationally disadvantaged interests could be the state and
local energy authorities. While FERC regulates, the state and local
energy authorities might represent. Representing interests in the
several electricity forums, RTO government, FERC, and legislatures
served now as broker, now mediator, now ombudsman.
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 25 (1984).
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is a difficult business.
Public representation is particularly
disadvantaged. Issues in the industry are complex and arcane. On
one hand, fear of damaging the delivery of reliable service often
inhibits public representatives, including legislators, from
questioning industry policymaking. On the other hand, simplistic
answers may, in fact, do more harm than good. More importantly,
the true impact of choices may not be recognized, and
representatives of the public and other interests can be easily teased
along with solutions that might not adequately reflect concern for
those interests.
In the old regulatory regime, the role of state and local energy
authorities was defined within the national regulatory system.
Their function was always subordinated to the larger whole. The
new regional configuration could set them free to become
independent public representatives, unimpeded by system
constraints. With such freedom, each state and local authority will
be alert, creating multiple independent and public-sensitive
oversight opportunities. Cooperation and sharing of resources and
information with other interests will make them stronger and more
influential. Indeed, a tacit division of labor might arise that will be
valuable to these always underfunded entities. On the other hand,
unity among state regulatory authorities will give them more
influence with Congress, FERC, and the RTOs. Imagine the impact
that, say, the unified views of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio
energy authorities might have on national and RTO policymakers.
This role of public advocate and defender of the
underrepresented will create a positive image for state regulators.
Such a role may acquire much more stature than the second class,
often deadweight, role of their former position. Certainly, it will be
superior to the coconspirator image they often acquired in the
regulatory days and may be in danger of retaining in the new
regime. Even though they seem to be losing their former direct
power, in the end they could become stronger and more important to
the efficient and fair performance of the electricity industry.

2. Investigative I Disclosure Vehicles
Transparency, while it might protect the market, is not enough
to protect the public. 57 Electricity is so fraught with business and
engineering complexity that even honest disclosure, as such, is of no
use to many interests. State and local energy authorities have the
expertise to understand the information made available by the RTO
and the incentive to evaluate that information from the public's
point of view. These authorities can digest and develop information
for both the general public and interests that cannot do so
57. See Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets-FactFinding Investigation of Potential Manipulation of Electricity and Natural Gas
Prices, 99 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,272 (2002).
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themselves.
State and local authorities also have the expertise and,
hopefully, will retain the resources to conduct independent study
and investigation.
As we have seen, the industry has for
generations controlled the freestanding study organizations and
high-profile scholars. Public representatives and those of several
other interests simply lack the resources to replicate that research
and scholarship. The staffs of state and local regulatory authorities
can fill the analytical gap to the benefit of the public
representatives, as well as the furtherance of crafting a new role of
governmental energy authorities.

3. Monitors I Whistleblowers
Implicit in the above, but more confrontational, is direct
oversight. Hopefully, public-regarding conduct will follow public
representation and transparency, but such a collaborative ideal
seems unrealistic given the industry's history. 58 It is likely that
from time-to-time, the public interest will require more than
honorable aspirations and full disclosure; its representatives will
have to employ coercive means.
Publicity can be a powerful tool. State and local energy
authorities may resort to the coercive effect of publicizing industry
misconduct. Drawing attention to the real impact of the conduct of
the RTOs or their members may be an effective, yet non-intrusive,
device for curbing public-disregarding behavior. Fear of disclosure
may be a deterrent that will make actual whistleblowing rarely
necessary.
Direct action may be found necessary under certain conditions. 59
It may be that the state and local energy authorities themselves
should retain some coercive mechanisms, but that will quickly raise
many of the questions which plagued the old regime. A cleaner
approach may be to transform them into independent advocates for
public-regarding policies before FERC, Congress, and state
legislatures. More directly, they may also be given authority to take
court action on behalf of the public or groups who lack the resources
to do so.
4. Individual Complaints
In addition to monitoring general policy and conduct, the state
and local energy authorities could perform an equally valuable
58. See, e.g., RICHARD RUDOLPH & SCO'IT RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE
HUNDRED-YEAR WAR OVER ELECTRICITY (1986) (outlining the clashes of various
interests during the industry's last century).
59. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement
for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1626 (2003) ("In a deregulated
market, enforceable remedies for misconduct are important to deter fraud and
other types of strategic market manipulation.").
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function regarding individual relations with the RTO and its
members. The mediation character of an ombudsman, rather than
an adversarial approach, seems preferable here. Ombudsmen try
hard to work with decision makers to correct problems. However,
this approach requires a good deal of public trust. In the first
instance at least, regulators acting as ombudsmen act informally
and within the organization. They often find in favor of the
organization instead of the individual complainant. In those cases,
the individual must, in the end, believe that the ombudsman
operated with integrity. On the other hand, the ombudsman must
have the respect of the system. The RTO must recognize that
compliance with the ombudsman's decision is in the best interest of
the organization, even when they believe that the decision was not
balanced. 60
While the function of ombudsmen is to "work out" differences,
resolution of some controversies may ultimately require some
coercive authority. Such dispute resolution does not seem to have
been given much attention in RTO design except as between
members. 61 RTOs probably assume that an administrative process
will address such disputes. The new role for state and local energy
authorities should include consideration of the extent and nature of
their adjudication of individual disputes with the RTOs and their
members. One approach is for the governmental authorities to
provide the forum for dispute resolution. Alternatively, the RTO
could provide its own adjudicative process. While this might raise
some superficial questions of impartiality, the dispute resolution
process could be designed to assure independence from the RTO. 62
The governmental authority then could provide independent
advocates to complainants, who would not be part of the RTO's
adjudicative entity.
VI. CONCLUSION
We are well into the first generation of organizing the
restructured electricity industry.
The future no doubt holds
obstacles and glitches. Nonetheless, some sound work has been
done. System designers, both public and private, have moved us
along in measured steps with due regard for the peculiarities of the
industry. Justifiably, they have concentrated on managing the
business. However, a system as pervasive and crucial to our society

60. The ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice has
an ongoing ombudsman project from which guidance could be obtained. For a
summary of both public and private ombudsman functions, see Mary Rowe &
Dean M. Gottehrer, Similarities and Differences Between Public and Private
Ombudsmen,
at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/
Sector
g&rsimilar.html (1997).
61. PJM OA, supra note 17, § 16.5, at 53.
62. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).

2005]

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

615

as electricity must be acceptable to the whole community. Attention
to principles of participation (real rather than apparent),
accountability, and transparency will foster community satisfaction.
But those features will also enhance the overall performance of the
RTO-governing institutions. What economists call "rents" are as
available from a dominant position in internal governance as from a
dominant position in the market. Therefore, sound governing
institutions are as important to efficiency as they are to fairness and
acceptability.
This Article has made some observations and
recommendations for furthering the goals of collaborative
governance. In the end, the message is that much more thinking
and experimentation are necessary. There undoubtedly are many
other issues that will need to be identified and addressed as best
governance practices are implemented. The electricity system is too
important and too complex to ignore the views of any interest, and
this Article suggests some first steps in realizing the goal of
ensuring both broad and effective representation of all affected
interests.

